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PERSONAL PROPERTY AND SALES-1955 TENNESSEE SURVEY
CLYDE L. BALL*
SALES

The cases of Edwards v. Central Motor Co.' and Hunter v. Moore2
offer interesting variations upon the same basic problem. In the
Edwards case plaintiff automobile dealer sold a car to X in what was
intended to be a cash transaction. X paid for the car with a worthless
check and received possession of the car together with a carbon copy
of a bill of sale executed by plaintiff. X then took the automobile to
another dealer and sold it to him, giving the purchaser a bill of sale
executed by X. Defendant was present at this transaction; at no
time did X exhibit the copy of his bill of sale from plaintiff. Defendant
then bought the car from the second dealer. When the check received
by plaintiff was dishonored, he brought replevin to recover the car.
It seems to be agreed that the parties to the original sale did not
intend that title should pass to X until the check was paid. This being
true, the title remained in plaintiff under the provisions of the Uniform Sales Act.3 Defendant's principal contention was that plaintiff,
having clothed X with indicia of ownership (the copy of the bill of
sale) and having delivered possession of the chattel to X, was estopped
to assert his title against an innocent purchaser for value without
notice. Obviously, however, as Judge Hickerson pointed out, estoppel
requires more than misleading acts on the part of the plaintiff; there
must also be reliance and a subsequent detriment to the defendant.
In the Edwards case there was no evidence whatever as to reliance,
so that plaintiff was entitled to recover the automobile.
In Hunter v. Moore the plaintiff automobile dealer originally bought
an automobile from a resident of the State of Georgia, and took a bill
of sale from the vendor. As Georgia is a "non-title" state, and the car
bore Georgia license tags, nothing more was required to vest title in
the plaintiff. Plaintiff then sold the automobile to X who gave a
worthless check in payment. (The villain in the two cases appears to
have been the same individual). Plaintiff stated in the sale order
signed by X that plaintiff retained title until the check was paid.
Plaintiff also retained the original bill of sale from the Georgia vendor.
In order to protect X against possible difficulties with highway police,
plaintiff executed and delivered to X a notarized bill of sale purporting to convey unencumbered title to X. The latter took possession of
* Assistant Professor of Law, Vanderbilt University; Faculty Editor, Vanderbilt Law Review.
1. 277 S.W.2d 413 (Tenn. App. M.S. 1954), afl'd, 277 S.W.2d 417 (Tenn. 1955).
2. 276 S.W.2d 754 (Tenn. App. E.S. 1954).
3. TENw. CODE ANN. § 7211 (Williams 1934).
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the car which now bore a Tennessee "drive-out" tag, and immediately
drove it to an auction and sold it to defendant. X represented the automobile to be a Georgia car not requiring a prior title certificate, and
exhibited the bill of sale which he had obtained from plaintiff. When
the check was dishonored plaintiff brought replevin to recover the
car. The Eastern Section 'of the Tennessee Court of Appeals ruled in
favor of the defendant. The court in its opinion appears to be treating
the case as one of estoppel-that is, that the plaintiff having clothed X
with possession and indicia of perfect title will not be heard to say
that he did not pass title when the rights of an innocent purchaser
intervene. The court points out that the Tennessee Motor Vehicle
Title and Registration Law4 enables a dealer to pass title without obtaining a certificate of title in his own name, and as there was no
previous title, defendant could ieasonably rely upon the bill of sale. 5
The court then goes on to say that title actually passed to X upon
delivery to him of the notarized bill of sale by plaintiff. No mention
was made of the expressed intent of the parties, not controverted by
evidence other than the bill of sale, that title should remain in
plaintiff until the check was paid. If even a voidable title actually
passed, it would not seem necessary to talk in terms of estoppel, as the
transfer to defendant had taken place before the check was dishonored.
No doubt it would be a burden upon automobile dealers and the
state registration office to require that dealers obtain title certificates
in their own names for all automobiles which they purchase for resale. So long, however, as they are permitted to transfer title by bill
of sale only, there will be occasional instances of fraud resulting in
loss to innocent persons. So in Commerce Union Bank v. Overal0
a dealer sold a new automobile, on which no title certificate had ever
been issued, to defendant under a conditional sales contract; the
dealer then assigned the contract and notes to a finance company.
The dealer then delivered a bill of sale on the same automobile to
plaintiff bank, which had been financing him, and obtained a loan from
the bank. Under these circumstances the finance company prevailed
against the bank in a contest for possession of the automobile.
CONDITIONAL SALES

What is a Conditional Sale? In the case of Matthews v. Archie7 the
parties executed a contract whereby defendant agreed "to sell" and
plaintiff agreed "to pay $1250 in weekly installments of $30.25" for an
automobile. Plaintiff further agreed that if he ceased to use the car
4. Tenn. Pub. Acts 1951, c. 70.

5. To the same effect see Jackson v. Wailer, 190 Tenn. 588, 230 S.W.2d
1013 (1950).

6. 274 S.W.2d 15 (Tenn. App. M.S. 1954).

7. 268 S.W.2d 334 (Tenn. 1954).
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as a taxicab he would pay the balance in full, "or such as the owner
deems within his power." Plaintiff paid $242.00 and apparently defaulted in further payments. Defendant regained possession of the
automobile, but did not sell pursuant to the provisions of the conditional sales statute.8 Plaintiff sued under the conditional sales statute
to'recover the $242.00. The court held that the transaction was not a
conditional sale. Under the Tennessee statute a conditional sale must
be evidenced by a writing executed at the time of the sale evidencing
the retention of title as security for the purchase price. The court
found no such evidence here. 9 The court stated the rule that conditional sales are out of harmony with registration laws and should
not be extended by implication. This particular rule is based upon a
desire to protect third parties; as no third party was involved in this
case there was no occasion to invoke the rule. The conditional sales
statutes were designed to protect purchasers against unfair treatment
by the conditional vendor; this purpose could have been effectuated
by calling the transaction a conditional sale, without reference to the
policy of the registration laws. The opinion appears to apply properly
the rule that where there is a doubt as to whether a contract is one of
conditional sale, the doubt will be resolved against that construction.
Failure of Vendor's Assignee to Follow Statute: Ballinger v. Delta
Loan & Finance Co.'0 presented the interesting question as to what
effect failure to advertise and resell repossessed chattels, as required
by the Conditional Sales Act," will have upon the rights and duties
of the original conditional vendor as against his assignee. Defendant
was an automobile dealer who sold certain automobiles under conditional sales contracts. He then assigned the contracts and purchasers'
notes to plaintiff finance company. Plaintiff repossessed certain automobiles upon default of their purchasers, but did not advertise and
resell them in accordance with the terms of the statute. Had this
been the whole story, the court states by way of dictum, the assignorindorser would have been released from liability upon the contracts
2
and notes, just as the defaulting purchasers would be released.'
There was an additional important factor in the case, however.
Defendant's indorsement of the notes provided that in case of default on the part of the conditional vendee, then defendant vendor
would repurchase the notes from plaintiff for the balance due upon
them. Upon repossession of the automobiles in question, plaintiff
offered to deliver them to defendant, pursuant to the repurchase agree8. TENN. CODE ANN. §§ 7286-98 (Williams 1934).
9. The provision that the purchaser should pay the full balance "or such as
the owner deems within his power," indicates that the parties still considered
the vendor to be the owner. There is no indication that he retained ownership
for security purposes, however.
10. 277 S.W.2d 368 (Tenn. 1955).
11. TENN. CODE ANN. §§ 7287, 7291 (Williams 1934).
12. See Commerce Union Bank v. Jackson, 21 Tenn. App. 412, 111 S.W.2d
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ment. Defendant refused to accept them, and this refusal cost him the
protection afforded by the Conditional Sales Act.
The holding of the court seems clearly correct. The Conditional
Sales Act is intended to require the person who, by the terms of the
contract, will sell the chattel upon default to conduct the sale under
conditions calculated to insure fair treatment of the debtor. Under
the repurchase agreement the dealer and the finance company contemplated that the dealer should conduct the public sale of the automobiles. When by his own breach of this contract he imposed the
duty of disposing of the automobiles upon the finance company, he
was no longer in the position of the conditional vendee, and could
insist only that the finance company act in accord with common-law
principles.
Replevin as Device to Perfect Right to Resell: When a conditional
vendor obtains possession of the chattel which was the subject of the
sale, but he obtains it for some other purpose, how can he perfect his
right to resell upon default of the conditional vendee? This question
arose in Duplicator Supply Co. v. Patterson13 where the conditional
vendee returned the chattel to the vendor's representative with the
statement that the vendee was forfeiting his down payment and
rescinding the contract on the ground that the chattel was not satisfactory. The vendor, seeking to convert his position into that of a
repossessing creditor, brought a replevin action. Without indicating
what action, if any, might be necessary or sufficient, the Supreme
Court simply ruled that replevin could not, by its nature, be brought
to obtain possession of a chattel which the plaintiff already possessed.
Replevin seeks to obtain possession, not to create any particular type
of possessory holding.
870 (M.S. 1937); Commercial Credit Co. v. McConkey, 9 Tenn. App. 605 (E.S.
1929).

13. 270 S.W.2d 467 (Tenn. 1954).

